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I
The paradox that has always plagued the theorist and the practitioner in the con-
sideration of the insurance contract in the conflict of laws is the variance in the result
which the use of the same "contacts" may produce. The explanation is simple:
Insurance law is still state law.' Companies, incorporated as they may be in small
states, such as Connecticut and Delaware, carry on business with hundreds of
thousands of customers whose residences are in other states. Nine out of ten ordi-
nary insurance transactions contain, by virtue of this incidental fact, a foreign element
sufficient to bring choice-of-law questions into play. When controversies arise, there-
fore, the same concept may meet with many different interpretations, depending on
the jurisdiction whose law is held to govern.
An illustration: One of the most generally accepted rules seems to be that, absent
a statutory rule to the contrary, a contract of insurance is governed with respect to
matters of its execution, essential validity, construction, and effect by the law of the
place where it was made 2 -the place where occurred the last event necessary to form
a binding agreement.' The determination of what constitutes this event, however,
varies among the several jurisdictions, and this entails conflicts. Fidelity Mutual
Life Association v. Harris4 is sufficiently exemplary. There, the life insurance
policy, which had been issued at the main office of the insurer in Pennsylvania, was
delivered to the applicant in Texas. It contained the usual clause: "The policy
shall not be binding until delivery during the lifetime and good health of the
*D.U.J. 19o8, University of Vienna. Member of the New York bar; Distinguished Professor of
Law, University of Buffalo School of Law. Onetime Justice of the Austrian Court for Constitutional
Matters, and Professor in Vienna.
' The upshot of the decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533
(944), if read together with the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 59 STAT. 33 (945), 15
U. S. C. § 1o1 (1952), is the declaration of the federal government that it is for the states to regulate
the business of insurance (as they have done it before), unhampered by federal legislation relating
to interstate commerce. Cf. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (r946); Robertson v.
California, 328 U. S. 440 (1946). What the South-Eastern Underwriters decision achieved was the
subjection of interstate insurance transactions to the federal antitrust legislation; and the above act of
1945 created an option for the states, by assuming the corresponding responsibility through legislation
of their own, to avert this subjection of their insurance companies to the federal antitrust laws.
'See, e.g., I GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 194, at 430 (1931); JOHN A.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 7079 (1943); McHaney, "Binding Receipts" and Conflict
of Laws, 1947 INS. L. J. 206, 207.
aE.g., Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., so6 F. 2d 921 (3 d Cir. 1939). See also RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF Lws § 311, comment d (935). For scepticism about the worth of such concepts,
see the thorough discussion in CHARLES W. CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAws AND LIFE INSURANCE CON-
TRACTs 26 (942). For the logical-legal objections to this whole concept, see WALTER W. CooK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 363 et seq. (1942).
a94 Tex. 25, 26, 57 S. 635, 636 (19oo).
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applicant and until the first payment due hereon has been made." Relying on this
clause, on a false statement in the application, and on the fact that under Texas law
such misstatement may be regarded as a breach of warranty effecting a forfeiture,
the insurer brought suit to cancel the policy. The Supreme Court of Texas, how-
ever, held that such clause did not suspend until delivery the operative effect of the
contract where the premium had already been paid and where the applicant, at the
date of the issuance of the .policy, was in good health. Accordingly, the contract
was held to have been made not in Texas, but in Pennsylvania, whose law viewed
the critical statements of the applicant only as misrepresentations and required more
to effect a cancellation-namely, a showing of the materiality of the misstatement
with respect to the risk.
Clearly, then, the outcome of this litigation depended not on the court's choice
between two competing concepts or sets of connecting factors asserted by the adverse
parties-as, for instance, might have been the case had one party referred to the place
of contracting and the other to that of performance-since the court and the parties
all seem to have been in agreement that the law of the place of contracting governed.
There was a question only as to the meaning of this term, and this was resolved
by the court's choice of law.
Even had the court defined the place of making the contract by reference to the
place of delivery of the insurance policy'--and, in fact, "delivery" of the insurance
policy has frequently been so construed--a further conflict might still have arisen,
for "the place of delivery varies with the method of delivery."7  There is some
authority that where delivery is by mail, the process of contracting is completed at
the moment of mailing, so that a manual surrender to the applicant is no longer
essential to effectuate contract;' there is other authority that the delivery is only
completed at the time when and at the place where the applicant receives the
policyY Should the former rationale prevail, the law of the state in which the in-
surer has its principal place of business demands control; should the latter, the
law of the place where the applicant has his residence.
Such diametrically opposed consequences may be drawn from similar choices
between meanings of other terms. For example, in the case of binder receipts,
'See, e.g., Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., io6 F. 2d 921 (3d Cir. 1939); Wilson v. Business
Men's Assurance Co. of America, 181 F. 2d 88 (9th Cir. i95o). We may disregard for the moment
terms expressly fixing the coming-into-effect of the transaction with reference to another fact, such as
payment of the first premium during plaintiff's good health. See, e.g., Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234 (1912) (place of payment held connecting factor); Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226 (i89i) (same). For, delivery of the policy to the applicant would,
of course, be irrelevant where the fact recognized as concluding the contract had not yet occurred. Potts
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 Pa. Sup. 392, 2 A. 2d 870 (938).
" See Carnahan, The Conflict of Laws in Relation to Insurance Contracts, in A. B. A. SEcnoN oV
INSURANCE LAw, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 58, 6o (1937).
"Edwards v. Commonwealth Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 197 F. 2d 62, 64 n. I (3d Cir. 1952).
'REsATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 317 (1934).
'E.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. ohnson, 293 U. S. 335 (1934); Faron v. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 176 F. 2d 290 (3d Cir. 1949); United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 258 N. Y.
32, 179 N.E. 250 (1932).
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offering-against payment of the first premium-provisional coverage prior to the
execution of the definite contract, the question often arises as to the date at which
such coverage has been attained. Is it the date of the application or that of ap-
proval at the home office of the insurer? The application frequently contains a
clause that states that "from the date of this receipt the insurance shall be in force
if the application is approved ... by the home office of the company, and the money
for which the receipt is given is sufficient to pay in full the first year's premium."
The courts in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Ohio have construed this clause in a
manner similar to the Texas court in the Harris case, regarding the approval as
being merely a retroactively operating condition for coverage, which commences at the
time of the application, the place whereof, for this reason, determines the applicable
law. The courts in all other states, however, have taken the opposite view, regarding
the act, place, and time of the approval as the determinant for the inception of the
coverage.' To appreciate the significance of this difference in the construction of
the same clause, one need only conjure up a case in which the event insured against,
such as death, fire, the incident involving liability, and so on, occurred between the
two decisive dates.
No doubt, these conflicting results reflect the rift between the interests involved
and their differing views on public policy. On the one hand, it may be urged that
uniformity of rules is essential for certain types of insurance business, such as that
conducted by nation-wide fraternal benefit associations; that it greatly facilitates the
calculation of risks; and that diversification of rules increases costs both to the in-
surers and, particularly because of the prevailing mutual type of insurance, to the
insured public." On the other hand, it may be pointed out that a claimant may
prevail only under a law other than that of the insurer's domicile, and that the
applicability of such other law, because of the elasticity of such "contact" concepts
as "making,"'" "performance," and "implied intention" can be established with
equal facility.' 3 Where, therefore, as is often the case, the forum coincides with
the insured's domicile, the courts have frequently applied the lex fori, particularly
where it favors the insured,14 although the contrary is now and then observed1
The forum has also resorted to its own law in absence of any assertion of the law of
the state which, in view of the forum, controls.' It may be helpful at this point to re-
1" E.g., Fields v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 18 S. W. 2d 521 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App.
1938). See also McHaney, supra note 2, at 206; Pierson, The Conflict Problems in Relatiog to Insurance
Company Management, in A. B. A. SECTioN op INsURANCE LAw, REPORT Op PROCEEDiNGS So, 82 (1937);
CARNAHAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 27.
1" See Pierson, supra note io, at 84.
"
5 See Carnahan, supra note 6, at 6r.
" See e.g., Mercier v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 145 Me. 374, 44 A. 2d 372 (i945).
"E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Orlopp, 25 Civ. App. Tex. 284, 61 S. W. 336 (i9ox).
"'E.g., Griffith v. New York Life Ins. Co., ioi Cal. 627, 36 Pac. 13 (894); Fields v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, Xi8 S. W. 2d 521 (Kansas City, Mo., Ct. App. 1938). Buit see Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of New York v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262 (i9oo) (forum (Montana) had given New York law,
favorable to Montana insured and beneficiary, preference over lex loi, but Supreme Court reversed).
"E.g., Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Ruby, 219 Ark. 729, 244 S. W. 2d 491 (i95i).
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member, however, that the foregoing discussion presupposes the absence of statutory
provisions as to matters of choice of law.
II
Harmonious criteria for the determination of the law applicable to the matter
at issue are, thus, seen to be unsusceptible of attainment through the use of uniform
conceptualistic theories. Substantial uniformity within a confederated nation can
rather be achieved only where the community is subject to a single system of private
law or where the various member states, by compact or by the adoption of definite
criteria for the ascertainment of the law governing the particular insurance trans-
action, have created unitary rules.
Concerning the former, it suffices to refer to the principles of our constitutional
system. Generally, not even the determination of the law to be applied by a court
is one controlled by the Constitution, for the "doctrines of the conflict of laws ...
being purely a question of local common law [are] a matter with which [the United
States Supreme Court] is not concerned."' 7  This philosophy also manifests itself
in cases of conflict between the legislative policies of sister states, since "the full
faith and credit clause does not ordinarily require [a state] to substitute for its own
law the conflicting law of another state, even though that law is of controlling force
in the courts of that state with respect to the same persons and events."'"
Adverting to the latter, efforts to reconcile the various judicial approaches to the
determination of the applicable law had their effect upon the Section of Insurance
Law of the American Bar Association. Each of the Section's two consecutive meet-
ings, the first in Cleveland in 1938,'" and the second in San Francisco in 1939,20 was
presented with a draft solution. The second draft, which developed more exactly
than its predecessor criteria for the allocation of control to the states concerned,
emphasized the possibility of uniform provisions in the area of choice of law and
noted the trend toward expansion of control by the lex foi, which at that time, 1938,
was not yet so dearly perceptible as now.
However, the twilight of such gods as New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head2' and
" Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 17I, 176 (1916).
"
8 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 436-37 (i943).
1
" Preliminary Draft No. r, Appendix B to the Report of the Committee on Qualification and Regu-
lation of Insurance Contracts, A. B. A. SECTo, OF INsuRANCE LAw, PROGRAM' AND CoMMTirE Rrpo=r
65-67 (1938).
2°Second Draft, Appendix B to the Report of the Committee on Qualification and Regulation of
Insurance Contracts, A. B. A. SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, PROGRAI AND CoMMItrEE REPORTS [hercn-
after CoMItTEE REsOR'r] 39, 50 et seq. (1939).
11 234 U. S I49 (1914) (Missouri court had applied to life insurance policy, which bad been applied
for and delivered in Missouri, Missouri nonforfeiture statute that, after three years, keeps policy in force,
upon default in both repayment of policy loan and payment of premiums, by using three quarters of
premium reserve as single premium and subtracting amount of loan from policy proceeds; Supreme Court,
however, held application of Missouri law to be violative of due process, since policy loan agreement had
contained stipulation of New York law, and its execution in New York supplied-technically-a criterion
for the application of New York law, which applies reserve to satisfaction of loan.)
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New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge22 was already looming 3 In any event, Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins,24 decided at this juncture, terminated the application of a
"general law" of insurance, through which technique the federal courts had, for
nearly a century, been able to develop in diversity cases uniform principles and rules
that, to some extent, differed from those applied by the courts of the state in which
the federal court was sitting.-° And a few years later, in a significant expansion
of doctrine, it was held that a federal court, in true consonance with Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, was constrained to follow the conflict-of-laws rule of the state in which
the court was sitting'
Returning to the draft, however, in selecting the connecting factors to determine
the law applicable to an insurance relationship which has contacts with two or more
states, there was adopted as a guiding postulate the idea of a unitary controlling
law.2 7  In general, it has always been held that an insurance relationship cannot be
fragmented, as the scission of a unitary contract, it has been felt, would produce
great inconvenience, confusion, and difficulties.28 The Supreme Court has endorsed
this thesis in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken,29 holding that the application of the
lex fori to an insurance relationship subject from its inception to another law would
be violative of due process. The draft, therefore, sought to enunciate a set of rules
which would, from the outset, advise both the insurer and the insured of the con-
trolling law. Thus, following the theories that underlie provisions enacted by many
states,30 the draftsmen tried to localize an insurance relationship by rating the degree
22 246 U. S. 357 (1918) (facts similar to those in Head case, supra note 21, but Supreme Court's
rejection of lex Ion even more startling, since residence of both insured and beneficiary had always been
in state of forum.)
" See, e.g., Cordell v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 208 N. C. 632, x82 S. E.
141 (1935) (lex fon, which was also domiciliary law of insured, prevailed over stipulated law of place
of insurer's main office and of issuance of policy). Carnahan, supra note 6, at 63, observes that the
decision in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Liebing, 259 U. S. 209 (1922) (recognizing the
application of lex Iori to policy loan agreement made elsewhere) may possibly be taken as overruling
"impliedly" the Head case and the Dodge case. And long before these decisions, the Court had recog-
nized that the forum may reject the application of a law selected by the parties, where contrary to the
compulsory provisions of the lex for. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389 (I9oo).
"4 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
"E.g., federal courts, unlike most state courts, recognized suicide of the insured as a defense, even
where the policy was silent on the point. Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1o9 U. S. 139 (1898). For
discussion of the contrary attitude of the state courts, see WILLIAm R. VAtc, CAsEs ON Ta LAW oF
INstUANCE 296 (3d ed. 1940).
2'Sampson v. Channell, aio F. 2d 754 (ist Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 650 (1940) (tort
case); Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941) (right to interest on judgment in
contract action); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (194i) (Texas concept of effect of local public
policy on question of what law is applicable to claims of assignees of beneficiaries without interest in the
life of insured held operative). Also see generally CoOK, op. cit. supra note 3, at io8 et seq.
27 CommiTs rE REPORT, op. it. supra note 2o, at 39 et seq. See also, Patterson, The Conflict Prob-
lems in Relation to Insurance Regulatory Statutes, in A. B. A. SacrioN€ oF INSURANcE LAw, REPORT OF
PRocEEDINos 69, 75 (1937).
" See MARTIN WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 423, 453 (2d ed. 195o).
20 266 U. S. 389 (1924) (conversion of seven-year term life insurance policy into twenty-payment
life insurance policy does not change governing law from that of Tennessee to that of Texas, although
application for conversion emanated from Texas, where insured had moved from Tennessee).
"o For more detailed examination of these statutes, see part IV infra.
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of the interest of each of the states concerned and placing control of the relationship
in the state that seemed to have the paramount interest. In this manner, the residence
of the person whose life, health, or bodily safety was the subject of the contract, was
designated as the point of contact for the allocation of life, accident, or health in-
surance contracts; property insurance contracts were to be localized in the state of
the situs as far as real property and personal property having a fixed location were
concerned; and as for automobile insurance, the place where the vehicle was prin-
cipally garaged or used was regarded as the most appropriate connecting factor.31
These illustrations bespeak the courageous attempt made to replace conceptualistic
criteria, traditional for the choice of law in the field of contracts, by new tests de-
rived from a particular state's primary connection with and, therefore, interest in the
risk insured 2 Moreover, these tests were so logically and practically sound that even
at that time, when the doctrine of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta
and Pine Land Co.3 had not yet expended its force, they could hardly have been
challenged from the standpoint of due process. Nevertheless, the draftsmen, taking
into account the likelihood that not all the states would adopt the new tests, pre-
served to the nonconforming forum the resort to such conceptualistic points of con-
tact as the place of delivery of the policy or of its issuance3 4
Much as this draft needed supplementation and improvement, however, it was
never given due consideration, since even its original sponsors had come to query
"the necessity" for a uniform statute35 And after an ABA Round Table on the
draft in I94o,36 one year later, the project was declared "abandoned.""7
III
There are two other means, however, of subjecting an insurance transaction to
the same substantive rules, irrespective of the forum in which the case is to be heard.
The first, which has long been used in this country, is the insertion of a clause in the
insurance contract specifying that it shall be governed by the law of a named juris-
diction, for example, that of New York. What effect has such a stipulation in an
insurance contract? The answer involves the great conflict-of-laws problem usually
stated in terms of the alternative "autonomy of the parties" v. "predestined law,"" s
1 CO, tMrTrEE REPORT, op. cit. sipra note 2o, § I. In this article, the terms points of contact, con-
necting factor, and points of reference are used indiscriminately since they have the same meaning; they
are the criteria, tests, or legal theories for the determination of the applicable law. Cf. WOLFF, op. Cit.
supra note 28, at 99.
" See 3 ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 326 (1950).
s3292 U. S. 143 (1934).
s' CoMMITTEE REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2o, §2.
"
5 See A. B. A. SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 19 (1939). Cf. 3 RAEL, Op.
cit. supra note 32, at 326: "The draft has been abandoned because of opposition from a number of
representatives of insurance companies."
36A. B. A. SECTION OF INSURANIcE LAw, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 576 (940).
"
1A. B. A. SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, REPORT OF PROCEEDING 2 (0941).
" Rabel, a strong defender of the autonomy principle, refers to these terms. 2 RABEL, op. ct. .(pra
note 32, at 360 et seq.
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or "subjective' v. "objective" theory.39 That is to say, weighing against the principle
that the parties to an insurance contract may autonomously determine the law ap-
plicable to it (lex causae), there is the notion of a predestined local law as the lex
causae which determines the essential validity as well as the construction and the
effects of a valid contract.
In the field of insurance law, the autonomy rule has never gained a wide follow-
ing in this country, except in a few isolated areas. This may be explicable in light of
the fact that the elements which in our legal system set off insurance contracts from
other contracts point to more than differences in subject matter. The terms of the
latter arise out of a bargaining process, while those of the former, to a great extent,
have been fixed beforehand. This is as true now as it has been in times past, the only
difference being that where formerly the insurers had prescribed the terms of a life,
fire, or accident policy, and so on, the government now does it.
It is unnecessary to elaborate the manner in which many insurers in an era long
past, by means of equivocal terms, abused their economic superiority over a more or
less helpless, if not guileless, public; how administrative nihilism was necessarily stim-
ulated into administrative regulation; and how insurance became one of the most
highly regulated industries in the American economy.40 It suffices to observe that
"because of the fact that insurance vitally affects the public interest,"4' states,
in the exercise of their police power, have enacted insurance statutes for the purpose
of protecting the public from questionable practices. The provisions of such statutes
must be extremely rigid; their norms are imperative and compulsory in nature; and,
therefore, no clause in an insurance policy can be permitted to bargain them away 2
No public policy can be expressed more strongly by a state than that set forth in such
regulatory provisions enacted for the benefit of its residents. Nor can the judicial
branch of the government in such a state be permitted to disregard the protective
norms of its own insurance law and to apply against a resident the provisions of a
foreign insurance law, such as that of the foreign insurer's domicile, because of a
clause to that effect in the policy. This was forcefully underscored by the Supreme
Court in Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Clements?3 and New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Cravens44 at a time when substantial differences in the insurance laws of the home
state of the insurer on the one hand, and those of the forum and of the domicile of
the insured on the other were first bringing into sharp relief the demand by the
" Cf. ARTHUR NUSSBAUIM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 et seq. (1943).
"0 See generally Brook, Public Interest and the Conmissioners'--All Industry Laws, :5 LAw & CoN-
rEMPs. PROB. 6o6 (1950).
"XUnited States v. Sentinel Fire Insurance Co., 178 F. 2d 217, 229 (5 th Cir. 1949). See also 5
SAMUEL WILLISTN, CONTRACTS § 1765 (s937) and REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 58o(2) (d) (1932).
'
2 For more detailed treatment, see Lenhoff, Optional Terms and Required Terms in the Law oJ
Contracts, 45 MICI. L REV. 39 (1946).
48 140 U. S. 226 (i8gi) (applicability of Missouri nonforfeiture statute, discussed in note 21, supra,
where law of New York stipulated in policy).
4" r78 U. S. 389 (1goo) (fact situation similar to that of Clements case in note 43, supr'a).
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forum that its regulatory laws control insurance relationships involving its residents,
regardless of the stipulated subjection of the relationship to another law. '
Obviously, recognition of this demand by numerous federal and state courts4"
has had a bearing upon uniformity and, for this reason, predictability regarding the
question of the controlling law. An illustration: An automobile collision insurance
policy covering any trip made within the United States has been issued at the in-
surer's main office in State A, where there prevails the common-law rule of insurance
that any statement of a fact as of the date of the issuance of the policy is an affirima-
tive warranty, and that the failure to fulfill it literally affords a complete defenst to
insurer, irrespective of the materiality of the failure to the risk. The policy contains, in
accordance with the answers given by the insured owner in the application form, the
statement that the automobile is garaged in State B, the owner's domicile, a state
that has abolished the common-law rule and replaced it by a rule requiring ma-
teriality of the breach to the loss claimed. An injurious collision occurs in State
C, where the owner, a traveling salesman, has temporarily garaged his car. As-
suming even that the policy contains a clause subjecting it to the law of A, the forum
in B will, nevertheless, apply its law on warranties and not that of A.V 7 Illustrations
of misstatements made in applications for life or accident insurance may be more
striking,4s but since any probability is relative,49 an inference drawn from an instance
offering a degree of probability of less than the highest-a minori ad maius-seems
to be rationally conclusive."0
It may well be, of course, that many provisions of the stipulated law will be
held applicable. It has been suggested that even if the forum refuses to apply certain
" Needless to say, in favor of its own domiciliary, the insured, the forum will apply its law expressly
stipulated as applicable, although conceptualistically the contract might be regarded as "made" else-
where. E.g., Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Keyes, 138 F. 2d 382 (8th Cir. '943).
"
0 E.g., Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Bailey, 99 Colo. 57o, 64 P. 2d 1267 (1937) (policy
provision specifying control by domiciliary law of insurer held invalid; contract controlled by domiciliary
law of insured); Blackwell v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, r41 N. C. 117, 53 S. E. 833 (19o6)
(policy provision referring to law of home office of insurer held void; law of domicile of insured and
place of application controls); accord, Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 1x9 Fed. 629 (C. C. D. Mass.
19o2); Dolan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398 (1899). See also Saunders
v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 2x2 Mo. App. 186, 253 S. W. 177 (1923) (facts similar to those in
Clements and Cravens cases, notes 43 and 44 supra); New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston v.
Olin, 1r4 F. 2d 131 (7 th Cir. 1940) (forum applies in favor of resident insured its antiforfeiture statute
and not foreign law stipulated in policy); Keeley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 113 F. 2d 633
(7th Cir. 1940) (lex tori, which was also domiciliary law of insured, applied rather than law stipulated
in policy).
" Compare Dawsons Ltd. v. Bonnin, [1922] 2 A. C. 413, with Karp v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins.
Co., 134 Pa. Super. 514, 4 A. 2d 529 (1939).
"'Many statutes direct that, with respect to these types of insurance, statements of facts in the applica-
tion shall not be regarded as warranties and misstatements shall avoid the contract only if they are ma-
"terial. See, e.g., N. Y. INS. LAw §142, 149 (1949). See also cases cited by Carnahan, supra note 6, at
6 n. si, in which the courts whose laws exhibit this modern pattern, have disregarded the clause
directing control by the law of the insurer's domicile.
' See MosRts R. COHEN, A PREFACE To Loosc ioo et seq., i16 el seq. (1944).
" Where the domiciliary state of the insured has not yet regulated its law of warranties, another
forum, whose law has already been modernized by statute, has no reason to disregard the stipulated law
-which likewise lacks protective features. See Carnahan, note 6 supra, at 62 n. x2.
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rules of the stipulated law, that law, nevertheless, still controls the transaction.51 It
is one thing to say that the forum may properly refuse, for reasons of public policy,
to aid in the enforcement of foreign-created rights; for the party claiming these
rights may take its chances in another forum. 2 It is quite another thing, however,
for the forum to attempt to replace with terms sanctioned by its own law con-
tractual terms valid under a foreign law whose control over the transaction properly
cannot be disputed by the forum; for by so doing, the forum would actually rewrite
the contract and destroy rights without offering any compensation.
53
These difficulties are resolved, however, by the realization that the forum may
deny enforcement of a foreign rule and apply its own for reasons other than those
of public policy. Such, indeed, is the case where the substantial interest of the
forum is evinced by the residence of the insured, which, moreover, frequently coin-
cides with the place of the application for and delivery of the policy.
Not all of the rules of the forum belong to the class of imperative norms which
exhibit a strong public policy and may not be waived;54 and to the extent that they
are rather optional or pliable norms,5 the parties are at liberty to supplant them by
those of their own choosing, such as those of a foreign law.'( Accordingly, a stipu-
lation of foreign law is not necessarily devoid of significance;5" but in so far as this
foreign law is inconsistent with the "unwaivable"-i.e., compulsory-norms of the
law governing the transaction, it must yield thereto.5
From what has been said, it follows that the forum will recognize the chosen
law as controlling in various situations:
In the first place, the chosen law may be that of the forum itself."
In the second place, if the chosen law is other than that of the forum, a substantial
G1 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 32, at 414. The authority upon which Rabel relies is a broad state-
ment in I Coucr, op. cit. supra note a, § 199, and the Head and Dodge decisions. It is doubtful
whether, in 1931, this authority adequately supported such a suggestion; the picture is different, however,
in 1956. See part IV infra.
52 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick 281 U. S. 397 (1930).
"Cf. CooK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 126, where issue is taken with Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S.
498 (94).
"
t Cf. Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S. 489, 501 (1907): ". • . mandatory statute which
the rarties have no power to alter or abrogate."
See Lenhoff, supra note 42, at 41; NUSSBAum, op. cit. supra note 39, at I6s.
n Sce G. C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 2o9 (4 th ed. 1952); NUSSBAUM, op. cit. supra
notc 39, at s62. Such an incorporation is nothing more than the parties' creation of contractual terms
(contractual-terms reference) in contrast to choice-of-law reference. The latter presupposes recognition
of the autonomy rule, for by the reference, the stipulation becomes the determinant for the law applicable
to the insurance relationship.
"' E.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551 (1904). Cf. N. Y. INS. LAw § r43 (r949).
Boole v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416 (i92i).
"8 E.g., Saunders v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., a1a Mo. App. x86, 253 S. W. 177 (1923); New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston v. Olin, I14 F. ad 131 (7th Cir. 1940); Union Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 99 Colo. 570, 64 P. 2d 1267 (1937); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Orlopp, 25 Tex. Civ.
App. 284, 61 S. W. 336 (19ox). See also Schnitzer, Freedom of Contract and Choice of Law, 19
SCHtWEIZER jiTPIsrEN ZEITSUNG 456 (1953) (in German): "In case the parties authorized by the lex cansae
to select a law want to make such a selection, they are able to do it only to the extent the compulsory
provisions of the lex causae eo not demand observance."
" See, e.g., Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Keyes, 138 F. ad 382 (8th Cir. 1943).
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connection-much closer than that of the forum-will justify the chosen law's claim
of control over the transaction ° Where the proximity of connection is not beyond
any reasonable doubt, adroit draftsmen might insert into the policy an additional
clause to the effect that if a term or condition of the policy is at variance with a
statute of another state, the conflicting provision shall be regarded as inoperative in
such state and the law of the state shall apply. 1
In the third place, one must realize that not all fields of insurance have been
subjected to extensive regulatory laws concerning prohibitory rules and compulsory
terms and conditions of the contract as have such mass types as life, accident, health,
automobile, and fire insurance. For these types, the standardized mass contract
form which necessarily is used is either authorized or prescribed by the government
because the parties are not of equal bargaining power.02 However, there has never
been a serious objection to an express stipulation of the applicable law in the field
of maritime (ocean-marine) insurance 3 or re-insurance. 4 The reason for main-
taining the principle of freedom to bargain here is the fact that the prospect's bar-
gaining power is equal to that of the insurer. Another reason lies in the great degree
of uniformity of the rules of marine insurance law all over the world. Thus, a
carrier by sea might get all the protection that is possible by his bargaining with
the marine insurer and, consequently, he will not offer strong resistance to a stipula-
tion expressly adopting the law of the underwriter's business domicile." In this
connection, one often finds in ocean-marine policies a general reference to English
law,"0 or a specific reference to the English Insurance Act of i9o607 and the condi-
tions and usages of Lloyds 0
A further factor preventing disputes over the applicable law in the field of ocean-
marine insurance is that the courts have either assumed that the control by English
law was in the mind of the parties, 9 or, in absence of judicial rules fashioned by the
6 See, e.g., Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance SoC'y, 266 N. Y. 7, 193 N. E. 897 (1934); ci.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262 (igoo).
" CI. Taggert v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 277 App. Div. 1051, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 563 (2d
Dep't 1950); Duncan v. Ashwander, 16 F. Supp. 829 (W. D. La. 1936); Sheehan v. Lewis, 218 Wis.
588, 260 N. W. 633 (935).
62See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 1072 (1953).
6"See Ehrewzweig supra, at 1084. Cf., inter alia, N. Y. INS. LAw 5 143(2) (1949), which expressly
exempts marine insurance contracts from the control by the compulsory provisions.
6 Cf. N. Y. INs. LAw §I40 (1949). See also Citizens Casualty Co. v. American Glass Co., 166
F. 2d 9I (7th Cir. 1948).
5 For a clause typically found in ocean-marine insurance contracts, see, e.g., Canton Insurance Office
v. Woodside, 9o Fed. 301 (9 th Cir. 898).
66See, e.g., Boole v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 Pac. 416 (1921) (argument that
stipulation of English law was void-and if valid, ineffective to extent that it varied lex for-rejected
by the court). See also Note, International Divergencies in Marine Insurance Law: The Quest for
Certainty, 64 HAmv. L. Rv. 446 (ig5r).
676 Enw. 7, c. 41.
66 See 2 RABEL, op. ct. supra note 32, at 379.
6 E.g., Compania Transatlantica Centroamericana, S. A. v. Alliance Assurance Co., 5o F. Supp. 986
(S. D. N. Y. 1943).
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Supreme Court, looked to that law because, as Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court in Queen Insurance Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co., stated, "there
are special reasons for keeping in harmony with the marine insurance laws of Eng-
land, the great field of this business."" °  Generally speaking, the particular clauses
characteristic of ocean-marine insurance originated in England, where the most im-
portant maritime insurer in the world, Lloyds, has its place of business.7 Naturally,
some divergencies have developed in matters such as the requirements for the as-
sumption of a constructive total loss of the ship,72 and in clauses such as "nearest
cause of loss," the construction of which cannot be separated from the facts of the
individual case.7 3 Apart from these minor variations, however, uniform ocean-marine
insurance rules have come into general use. As an illustration, one need only men-
tion the York-Antwerp Rules on the prerequisites for the right to, and the method
of computation and adjustment of general average7
Recently, however, in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance,-3 the
Supreme Court referred to state law as the supplier of an applicable rule for mari-
time insurance. The policy in question covered fire losses involving a small boat
used for the carriage of passengers over an inland lake between Texas and Okla-
homa. The point in issue was whether materiality was a prerequisite for forfeiture
in the case of a breach of a warranty. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Black, in the absence of a federal rule, either statutory or decisional, refused to
"fashion" one and applied instead Texas law, which insists on that prerequisite.
Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed to "the demands of uni-
formity relevant to maritime law" and held the disregard of them justifiable only
because of the "limited situation" characterized by the fact that the object insured
was a "houseboat" confined to the waters of Lake Texoma. Query: Shall counsel
in a future case involving a vessel serving shipping in its national or international
(in contrast to parochial) aspects base his advice on forty-eight different laws rather
than on the possibility of a Supreme-Court-fashioned rule inspired by English
experience?
Inquiring further into the media which serve to ensure conformity, we turn to
the process of standardization of the contents of insurance policies. This process
originated for the purpose of protecting insurers from the public practice which had
developed of insuring the same property interest against fire with two or more corn-
.0 263 U S. 487, 493 (1924). See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting, in Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 340 U. S. 54, 61 (195o); cf. inter alia, Aetna Insurance Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 92 F. 2d 576, 580 (2d Cir. 1938); Mellon v. Federal Ins. Co., 14 F. 2d 997, 1004 (S. D. N. Y.
x926); Compania Maritima Astra, S. A., v. Archdale, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
" Most American ocean marine policies today still substantially follow the Lloyds' policy of 1779.
72 For detailed examination of this divergence, consult authorities cited in note 66 supra. Cf. Calmar
S. S. Corp. v. Scott, 345 U. S. 427 (1953).
" See, e.g., Link v. General Insurance Co. of America, 56 F. Supp. 275 (W. D. Wash. 1944); c.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 340 U. S. 54 (1950).
" Last revised in 1950.
7348 U. S. 310 (955).
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panies. Differences in terms and conditions produced controversies and litigations.70
The insurance commissioners, in turn, became interested in the clarification of policy
terms and conditions. Finally, the legislatures intervened by enacting statutes which
prescribed a uniform policy1 The New York fire insurance policy, in its last
revised form, has been adopted in forty-five states. The remaining three states,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New Hampshire, have followed a policy form de-
veloped by the first mentioned state. For this reason, it makes little difference which
law a forum applies.
Although there is no statutory form for the "combined" automobile insurance,
it has been estimated that between seventy and seventy-five percent of total auto-
mobile liability insurance has the same standarized terms and conditions.1 8  And
the situation in the field of accident and health insurance is much the same. Enough
has been said about the trend towards uniformity to demonstrate the significance
of this matter for the subject of this study.
IV
Wherever a foreign insurer has engaged in local activities, the basis for jurisdiction
in personam over the insurer has, with different formulations, varying in time, been
recognized for the last one hundred years.79 On the one hand, therefore, the insured
or his privies can catch the insurer in the state of the insured's residence; on the
other hand, the insurer, in the role of plaintiff, must bring its action against the in-
sured in the same state. These jurisdictional concepts may well explain the efforts
undertaken by so many states to establish statutory choice-of-law rules which secure
the application of the domestic insurance law-i.e., control by the lex fori-over
matters involving their residents as insured parties. Although there is, of course, a
distinction between such control-securing statutes and other regulatory statutory
mandates-the former prescribe choice-of-law rules, while the latter enunciate rules
of domestic law-they are closely related functionally; the former secures the control
of the latter over insurance transactions over which another system of law might
otherwise claim control.
The statutes in question can be divided into two groups: The first identifies
some facts (which otherwise have not necessarily been regarded as determinants for
the choice of law) as connecting factors. Thus, for example, a Massachusetts statute
directs that the rules of its insurance law must unqualifiedly be made the basis of
" See the illuminating article of Hedges, Improving Property and Casualty Insurance Coverage, 15
LAw & CON EMP. PROB. 353 (95O).7 Id. at 358.
"I Id. at 360. A new general revision of the standard provisions for such policies, called "Standard
Automobile Policy," was made in 1955 by the National Automobile Underwriters Association.
"'It is characteristic that the first decision dealing with the problem of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations concerned an insurance company. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U. S. (8 How.)
404 (856), originated. the "consent" theory. For the further theoretical development, see the dis-
cussion in International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). See also Lenhoff, The
Peculiar Conflict-of-Laws Problems in the Recent American Law of Insurance, in INrERNATIONAL LAW
OF INSURANCE, FssrscRinFT i ALBERT EIRENZWEIG SENIOR 153, 556 et seq. (x955) (in German).
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any insurance contract either on any property or interest or lives in the common-
wealth or with any resident of the commonwealth8 ° Contracts at variance with these
rules are forbidden. More or less alike, in this respect, are the laws of Arizona,
California, Montana, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin!' It should be noted
that under this kind of statute-unlike, for example, that of New York 2-it is
irrelevant whether the final act making an agreement a binding contract takes place
in the commonwealth, or whether the policy was issued or delivered therein.
The second group of statutes is characterized by the use of an ordinary connecting
factor, such as "place of making the contract," but definition of the factor is so
home-made as to be at variance with the traditional concepts. It is quite apparent
that the purpose of using artificial criteria for a spatial connection is the "localiza-
tion" of the transaction within the territorial realm of the statute.8" Within this
group, we may discern four subgroups, each distinguished by the particular fact which
is statutorily treated as being determinative of the "place of making the contract."
The particular fact distinguishing the first subgroup is the place where the
prospect's application for the contract has been made. Alabama and North Caro-
lina have such an insurance statute."
In determining "the place of making" by the citizenship or residence of the person
to whom a "contract of insurance is payable," the legislation of Texas represents the
second subgroup! 5
In the third group, the local activity of a resident agent comes to the fore. Thus,
a Maine statute provides that any insurance contract shall be regarded in all respects
as having been made where effected by the agent! 6  Thus, in Mercier v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,s7 a recent Maine case, where the defendant insurer, a
Massachusetts company, urged the applicability of the law of Massachusetts, where
the final and binding act-viz., the acceptance of the application-took place, the
argument was rejected. The court justified its application of the lex fori, upon the
ground that a foreign insurer cannot avoid the effect of the statute which, in exact
terms, is designed to apply to the insurer's contracts, by asserting that they were not
" MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 175, §3 (1948).
" For citations, see McHaney, supra note 2, at 221.
"
5 N. Y. INs. LAW §143(2) (1949). This statute refers to a combination of criteria as factors sub-
jecting contracts concerning life, accident, health insurance, on the one hand, or property and liability
insurance, on the other, to New York law. These criteria are issuance or delivery of the contracts or
policy in New York, combined with residence of the insured, or situs of the property, or locus of the
tortious act, respectively.
" Hence the name "localizing" statutes. Cf. Note, Validity of Statutes Localizing Insurance Contracts,
13 N. C. L. REV. 213 (1935).
"'ALA. CODE tit. 28, §310 (i94i); N. C. GEN. STAT. §58-28 (1943).
8
"TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.42 (1952). By a statute of South Carolina, CoDE oF LA.vs oF
S. C. 1942 §7773, the taking or receiving of premiums or other charge on consideration from a citizen
or a domiciliary corporation in relation to an insurance contract is declared to be the making and the
performance of such contract in the state.
ME. REv. STAT. c. 56, §55 (i944). The statutes of Colorado, CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 87, §75 (1935),
and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 43, C. 3, §23 (1943), follow more or less the same line.
87 I41 Me. 374, 44 A. 2d 372 (945).
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executed in the state. Furthermore, the court pointed out that whether or not the
...policy was technically a Maine or a Massachusetts contract ...the company is re-
sponsible for the acts of an agent licensed in the state, in connection with an application
procured there from a resident thereof when our statute says that the agent stands in the
place of the company.
In other words, with or without the aid of the statute, the forum insisted that its
rules of compulsory character, designed to protect its own residents, must control a
business transaction "procured" by a local agent."' Incidentally, in another state,
for the same reasons, the concept of "agent" was also transformed by statutory
legerdemain which makes a person who is employed by the prospective insured to
procure insurance for him and is paid by him-the agent of the insurer 9  The
Supreme Court found no fault with this use of homonyms, otherwise a favorite type
of riddles, in the province of law. In American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber &
Mfg. Co., it thus held that a state may "regulate a foreign insurance company when
the latter comes to the former to do business with the citizens of the state and their
property.' 0 No wonder the Mercier case leally followed King Lumber.
Statutes of the fourth and last subgroup provide that "all contracts of insurance
on property, lives, or interests in this state shall be deemed to be made therein." The
statutes of Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Oklahoma fall within this
group.91 This statutory formulation clearly is broad enough to embrace both sub-
stantial and trivial connections of an insurance relationship with the state. Its
inherent fundamental defect, however, is illustrated in Turner v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co 9 There, a federal court, sitting in North Carolina, refused to adopt the
plaintiff's theory that North Carolina insurance laws control an automobile liability
insurance policy where the fact that the collision had occurred in North Carolina
was the only factor which connected it with the state-insurer and insured alike
being residents of states other than North Carolina, and the place of application,
issuance, and delivery of the policy being New Jersey. The root of the difficulty lay
in the statute's loose use of an intangible in the abstract--"interests in this state"-
as a criterion for the "localization" of another "intangible"--an insurance contract.
The statutory command, using an abstraction, such as "interests," must, lest it be
meaningless, point to an object ("referent") to which the abstraction refers. 3  That
is to say, there is no difficulty in finding meaning in the statutory localization of
"land" and "lives" because they are physical objects of sufficiently "concrete par-
" Cf. Sebesta v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1952), and
-no insurance case--Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N. Y. 297, go N. E. 468 (1949).
so3 FLA. COMP. GEN. LAws ANN. §6222 (1927).
00 25o U. S. 2, 12 (1919), affirming, 74 Fla. 130, 77 So. x68 (1917), which turned upon the
Florida statute cited in note 89 supra.
9 1 MINN. STAT. ANN. §60.28 (1946); Miss. CoD ANN. tit. 22, §5633 (1942); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§58-28 (943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §2 (1953).
9B 105 F. Supp. 723 (E. D. N. C. 1952).
92See ARTHUR LENHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION 701 et seq.
(1949).
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ticularity,"9 but the meaning of an abstraction such as "interests," without a reference
to a specific object, is boundless. 5 Does "interests" in the state embrace anything
from a liability arising from an incident therein or from a loss suffered by an em-
ployer as result of a fraudulent act of an employee, down to a damaging event
affecting goods in transit or merchandise continuously changing in quantity or loca-
tion and covered by a floating insurance?
The above decision answered the question as to liability arising out of a collision
in the state in the negative. The Supreme Court did likewise with regard to de-
falcations committed in Mississippi by an employee whose employer was insured
through a surety (fidelity) bond issued and delivered by the insurer in Tennessee,
where the employer carried on its business. These-in a nutshell-were the facts
of the famous case, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land
Co." Proceeding upon the theory that the application by the Mississippi forum of
its localizing statute97 to the insurance contract at issue violated due process of law,
the Court said:9
• .. the state of the forum [may not] convert . . . contracts elsewhere validly con-
summated .. .for all purposes into contracts of the forum regardless of the relative im-
portance of the interests of the forum as contrasted with those created at the place of the
contract....
It is doubtful that the Court would still, in 1956, couch its decision in the same
conceptualistic terms which could induce readers to believe that it regarded "place
of contract" as the decisive criterion in balancing the competing interests of the
states. However, the Court may well have used the term argumentatively rather
than decisively. If read in this light, emphasis was placed on the fact that the place
where the misdeed had been committed, must, in the absence of other local factors,
be regarded as proving "but slight connection of the forum with the substance of the
[insurance] contract obligations,"99 a contact too insignificant to "localize" the
insured interest in the forum.
A few of the localizing statutes seek to underpin the connection of the insurance
contract with the forum, by multiplying the localizing factors. For example, North
Carolina has brought itself by its localizing statute within the range of two classes,
one based on the "place of application," and the other marked by the localization
of "property, lives and interests.""'
"' See COOK, op. cit. supra note 3, at 295.
o For Bentham, "interest" was indefinable; for others, it may have a double aspect-on one hand,
that of a condition on which our subjective reaction to a certain object depends and, on the other, the
object itself. Cf. JuLIus STONE, ThE PROVINCE AND FuNCTION OF LAw 488 n. 4 (1946). See also
EDwIN W. PA-rrERsoN, JURJSPRuDENCE 520 (1953).
00 292 U. S. 143 (1934).
O ,. . . on property, lives or interests in this state." MIss. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §5633 (1942).
21 92 U. S. at 150.
00 Ibid.
"" N. C. GEN. STAT. §58-28 (1943). The subgroups involved are, in the terminology of this article,
the first and the fourth.
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V
Naturally, the existence of statutes of the kind discussed above does not, in
general, compel a forum to give their theories a preferential position vis-a-vis its own
conflict rules. For a few categories the proper law has been regarded as fixed by
the Constitution. 01 Furthermore, the latitude claimed by and accorded a forum in
the application of its own law has increased since the Delta and Pine Land case.
With an increase of regulations by the states and, in the field of social insurance, by
the federal government, the last two decades have witnessed, pari passu, a changing
attitude of the Supreme Court towards the deference with which a forum must
regard the law of another state where the connecting factor advanced is "the place of
making" or one of the other rigid mechanical concepts discussed above. First, in
cases involving Workmen's Compensation laws' 2 -so closely connected with in-
surance' 03--and later in cases affecting other branches of insurance law, the Court
has adopted a new approach based entirely on the forum's "substantial governmental
interest" in the substance of the insurance transaction, despite the fact that it might,
by technical, conceptualistic tests, be classified as an "extrastate contract."
This new trend has manifested itself in both the techniques by which the state
exercises control over a foreign insurer: greater administrative control through more
extensive regulation of the business activities of the insurer, and extension of the lex
fori to a multi-state transaction which had its legal inception in a state other than
that of the forum. This article is more concerned with the latter than with the
former technique. Nevertheless, it was a matter of regulation, not choice of law,
that occasioned Hoopestone Canning Co. v. Cullen,"°4 a case that most emphatically
repudiated the older views expressed in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head and New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, these two monuments of mechanical territorialism.
The shift in emphasis from conceptualistic mechanical criteria to pragmatic tests
derived from social-policy considerations that give weight to the substantial interest
of the forum in the risk insured by the contract cannot be denied. The demise
of Head and Dodge is an accomplished fact, the absence of an obituary notwith-
standing. 05 Translated into constitutional terms, the new approach amounts to this:
In any case, it seems clear that the preference given by the forum to its own law
over that of another state does not violate the full-faith-and-credit clause, if only the
insurance relationship has substantial contacts with the state of the forum, contacts
' See GEORGE W. STO MBERO, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws 67, 68 (2d ed. x951).
'First, in Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Cosm'n of California, 294 U. S. 532 (I935),
and thereafter, in Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493 (1939).
03 Cf. Lenhoff, Insurance Features of Workmen's Compensation Laws, 29 CORNELL L. Q. x76, 353(1943-44).
201 318 U. S. 313 (942). The case involved the application of New York regulations concerning
reciprocal insurance associations to an Illinois insurer of this kind who was not qualified to do business
in New York but had concluded, carefully evading any conceptualistic connection with New York,
about 50,000 contracts insuring New York landowners against fire risks.
10" These cases lost their vitality and have, in effect, been overruled, says the Comment on Watson v.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954), in 35 B. U. L. REV. 452, 46o (x955). See
also Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent, last paragraph, in Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 67, 69 (1940).
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by reason of which it would be competent for the forum to regulate the relation-
ship."' Nor is the forum under a constitutional duty to enforce the law of another
state, if the foreign law is antagonistic to its own strong public policy 107 or if, by its
own conflict rules, the law of the forum is applicable. It is only where the in-
surance contract does not affect any substantial interests of the forum that a case
for the extraterritorial due process doctrines would be well founded 08 Thus, most
of the difficulties disappear when it is recognized that the substantial interest doc-
trine "points up the increasing similarity between fourteenth amendment (due
process) and full faith and credit standards for testing the validity of legislation."'0 9
Ascertainment of the calculable attitude of the courts is not necessarily a function
of uniformity of results. Except for a few insurance types, the very nature of a
federated system, each member of which has maintained laws and courts of its own,
makes uniformity of results even if there were uniform insurance laws, almost im-
possible. However, certainty in forecasting results, which, from the functional stand-
point, has effects similar to those of uniformity, has been enhanced. In the first
place, jurisdictional factors point to domiciliary courts as those in which decisions
will be sought. In the second place, the application of the lex fori, in view of the
present trend towards a full recogniton of the power of the forum to give predom-
inance to its own law, will hardly be held to be in excess of constitutional limitations.
It is, of course, still true that the Supreme Court functions as the umpire among
states interested in the same transaction in determining which state law is to prevail.
However, can it still be said that, but for the absence of a formula more specific
tfan that rather general one-a state is not compelled to subordinate its own laws
concerning a matter involving its governmental interest-the court has not supplied
essential guidance for the assertion of control by the lex fori?
VI
CONCLUSION
Decisions of the last twenty years not only illustrate the spectacular conflict be-
tween the lex causae and the lex fori, but also highly certain judicial attitudes.
To observe only that the Court has shown a tendency to sustain the lex Jori as the
proper law wherever the insurance contract has considerable contact with the forum,
would still leave much unsaid. The actual limitations placed upon the scope of
the lex causae by the lex loci should also be noted. Where interests of a resident, even
though temporary ones, might be affected by a term or condition of a foreign-con-
trolled insurance contract, the Court has, to an ever-increasing degree, manifested a
hands-off policy vis-a'-vis the invalidation of such terms by the forum. The Court
"I E.g., Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 3o6 U. S. 493 ('939); State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 16o (1945).
""7 E.g., Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
... E.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936). Cf. Watson v. Em-
ployers' Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954) (relying also on the Delta & Pineland case, supra
note 96).
.. Note, The Supreme Court z954 Term, 69 HAv. L. REv. 19, 140 (r955).
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has given the lex loci wide scope for the protection of vital local interests, even to
the extent of enforcing its provisions at the expense of contractual terms.110
Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express"' is a case in point. There, assessments had
been imposed in a proceeding in New York on Georgia policyholders of a New York
mutual insurance company which had become insolvent. Clearly, this class of
obligations belongs to the narrow class over which the Court has claimed consti-
tutional control with respect to the choice of law, because the subject matter is
peculiarly within the regulatory power of the state of incorporation."' The Supreme
Court, however, sustained the Georgia forum's refusal to enforce the New York as-
sessment decree on the ground that the Georgia law of contracts, under which the
defendants had not become members of the company, controlled. In this connection,
Grifflin v. McCoach"3 should also be mentioned. There, the Court reminded that
a federal court, in deciding a diversity case, may not enforce an insurance contract
contrary to the public policy of the state in which it sits, despite the fact that when
tested by all conceptualistic links, such as place of issuance of the policy, delivery of
the policy, or payment of premiums and insurance proceeds, the contract is not one
of that state.
Finally, there is Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance."4 This case, decided
below by a federal district court in Louisiana, concerned the enforcement of a
Louisiana "direct action" statute against a foreign insurance company. The liability
insurance policy had been negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and delivered in
Massachusetts and Illinois to the insured, a Delaware corporation which had its head-
quarters in Massachusetts. The policy contained a no-action clause which was
valid under Massachusetts as well as Illinois law. The only connection that the case
had with the forum lay in the fact that the plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana, was in-
jured in Louisiana by using the insured's product, a hair-wave set, which had been
bought in Louisiana. Upon these facts, the Supreme Court, reversing the lower
courts, allowed the direct action.
It may be significant to observe here that, prior to the Watson case, even the
domestic courts," 5 including those of Louisiana," 6 in states where a direct-action
..0 See notes io5 and io8 supra.
il1314 U. S. 201 (1941), affirming, 191 Ga. 502, X3 S. W. 2d 337 (1941).
"' Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935). See also Cheatham, Federal Control o/ Conflict ol
Laws, 6 VAND. L. R . 581 (953).
Ia 313 U. S. 498 (194X).
214 348 U. S. 66 (I954).
.1. In the majority of cases, a foreign forum, i.e., one whose law does not include a direct-action
statute, has construed a foreign statute of this kind as procedural and declined, for this reason, to apply
it. E.g., Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N. NV. 2d 836
(946); McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, I86 So. 305 (1939). But see Burkett v.
Globe Indemnity Co., i82 Miss. 423, i81 So. 316 (1938). A forum in Michigan, where no such statute
exists, declined to apply the direct-action statute of Wisconsin, where the accident had occurred and the
insurance contract had had its inception, holding it to be contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum. Lieberthal v. Glen Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N. W. 2d 547 (1946).
110 In addition to the three decisions cited by Mr. Justice Black in 348 U. S. at 66 n. 6, see also
West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950); Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v.
Eunice Rice Milling Co., 198 F. 2d 613 (5 th Cir. 1952); Bayard v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F.
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statute had been enacted," 7 refused to apply such legislation in situations in which
the insurance policy contained a "no action" clause which was valid in the foreign
state where the contract was made. 1 8 Unless the insurance contract was held to be
controlled by the law of the forum because of the issuance or the delivery of the
policy there,"' the direct-action rule of the forum was regarded as inapplicable,
even where the claimant or the insured party was a resident and the accident had
occurred in the state of the forum.' ° Due process notions underlay the reasoning.
Thus, the highest court of Wisconsin had, in the leading case of Ritterbusch v.
Sexmith,' 21 characterized the no-action clause "as a substantial contractual right
of the company"; obviously, this right postpones the company's obligation until the
ascertainment of the insured's liability through judgment or tripartite agreement' 22
In the light of the foregoing, does the significance of the Watson decision lie in
a change of the localization of the insurance contract? Did the Supreme Court
arrive at the result that the insurance contract must be regarded as a contract con-
trolled by the law of Louisiana, a state entirely unrelated at the time of the issuance
of the liability policy to insurer or insured? Such a result would hardly have a basis
in legal logic or in decisional reasoning. In the first place, it is obvious that a cri-
terion for determining the proper law of the contract cannot be found in a local
relation which did not exist at the time of the consummation of the contract; for the
event out of which the liability arises, necessarily follows, in time, the liability insur-
ance contract. In the second place, the main opinion in the Watson case does no
more than recognize that Louisiana, the locus, is not "compel[led] . . . to subordinate
its direct action provisions to Massachusetts contract rules"' 2 -- and this thesis is
strongly underscored in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, which
emphatically rejects any substantive control over the contract by the lex loci. Trying
to fit the justifiable demands of the lex fori into a contractual pattern worked out
by the lex causae, the Watson opinion followed the suum-cuique principle. The
Supp. 343 (W. D. La. i95x), 104 F. Supp. 7 (W. D. La. 1952); Hidalgo v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
N. Y., 104 F. Supp. 230 (W. D. La. 1952). Contra: Buxton v. Midwestern Ins. Co., x02 F. Supp. 500
(W. D. La. 1952).
"" They are: Louisiana (LA. REv. SrAT. tit. 22, §655 (Supp. 1950) (based on La. Acts i95o, No.
54)); Rhode Island (R. I. GEN. LAws c. 155, § i (1938)) (based on R. I. GEM. LAws c. 258, § 7 (1923));
and Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. §85.93 (953)) (based on a statute of 193).
... Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N. W. 2d 6ii (1950); Byerly v. Thorpe, 221 Wis.
28, 265 N. W. 76 (936); Riding v. Travelers Ins. Co., 48 R. 1. 433, 138 Ad. 186 (1927); Coderre v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 48 R. I. 152, 136 Ad. 305 (927). For the attitude of the courts in Louisiana, see
note %x6 supra.
.. See Gandall v. Riedel, 133 F. Supp. 28 (E. D. Wis. 1955); Oertel v. Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251
N. W. 465 0933).
2' Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N. W. 2d 6i1 (1950); Riding v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
48 R. I. 433, 138 At. x86 (1927); Bayard v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W. D. La.
1951), 104 F. Supp. 7 (W. D. La. 1952).
L1 256 Wis. 507, 4 N. W. 2d 61x (950). The forum refused to apply its direct-action statute,
although the policy had been delivered and the accident had occurred in Wisconsin, because the court
regarded the insurance contract as a Massachusetts contract.
1'2 That is, a written agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the insurer.
1"-3 348 U. S. at 73.
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lex contractus controls in general, but the lex loci may step in to a very limited
extent. The limit is set by its "interest in taking care of those injured in the state."
Obviously, the formula that there must be a reasonable relation between the legisla-
tive action and the protection of the interest applies. Under this aspect, the Court
held that Louisiana has the right to subject foreign liability insurance companies to
its direct-action law regardless of the no-action clause of the insurance policy. Once
this point in reasoning was reached, the conclusion drawn by the Court seemed to be
irrefutable. Its proposition is that the local direct-action statute would be applicable
under the circumstances presented by the case, even in the absence of another statute
v1ich conditions the admission of such companies to the state for the purpose
of doing business there upon their consent to direct action. 24
The result is a sensible one, primarily for three reasons. First: Only if regarded
from a narrow contractualistic view of the liability insurance relationship can sup-
port be found for the reproach that the decision "varies" a term of the insurance
policy. Like an employment relationship, the matrimonial tie, or membership in an
association, the insurance relationship differs essentially from the ordinary contractual
relationship in that it regulates a lasting relationship. The typical contract lacks,
on the one hand, compulsory terms; and on the other, it is generally discharged
by one single performance. In contrast to it, the foregoing relationships are, to a
large extent, subject to minute regulation and sustained over a more or less ex-
tended period of time.
A reference to the modern employment relationship may be instructive. The
public interest reflected in imperative legislation is spatially limited in effect to the
territory of the state. The imperative norms of the lex fori, accordingly, will affect
the relationship only while the employee works in the state of the forum. Upon his
removal to another state, the applicable norms may vary."2" This also obtains with
respect to other relationships of similar character.
The Court reconciled the basic rule of the lex causae over the insurance relation-
ship with the claim of the lex Jori, by means of a process of allocation. It allocated
to the latter what seemed to be its due with regard to certain local aspects of the
relationship, but left undisturbed the control by the former of the balance. Such
a reconciliation of the competing claims of states united in the same federal system
has been undertaken by the Court for other relationships as well. As for the matri-
monial relationship, the "divisible divorce theory" brings to mind a choice-of-law
ruling which similarly rationalizes the allocation to another state of a share in the
control over a multi-state relationship by a proper appraisal of its governmental
interests therein.2'2
I LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §983-E (Supp. 595o) (based on La. Acts 195o, No. 542).
' Naturally this does not apply in case an employee is dispatched from his main working place for
a merely transitory job to a place in another state. See Lenhoff, Con/lict-of-Laws Problems in Labor
Law, 54 ZENTRALBLATT FUR DIE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS 769 (936) (in German); see also 3 RABEL,
op. cit. supra note 32, at x86.
.2 Cf. Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (948). For general treatment of the problem, see Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. x, 6 (1945).
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Second: Prior to the Watson case, governmental interests of a state have also
been recognized as sufficiently important to warrant extension of its administrative
regulations to foreign insurers. In this connection, such cases as Osborn v. Ozlin'17
and Holmes v. Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance28 might be mentioned in
addition to those already discussed. The Court has recognized that more than one
state may have a legitimate interest in certain local aspects of an insurance transaction
-such as the channeling of the business of insuring local risks into Virginia and
Montana, respectively, by requiring that the contracts be made through local agents.
Naturally, the legislative power to control administratively the conduct of foreign
insurers within the state has not been in issue, but only the extent of the control
consistent with contractual freedom. Again, there has been the question of how to
reach administratively foreign insurers operating from out-of-state offices;... but
here, too, no conflict problem is involved, as only the state itself can enforce its own
administrative regulations.
By contrast, the merely contractual approach to insurance relationships, the facts
of which show existing or potential contacts with more than one state, brings con-
flict problems into play. Heretofore, a forum intent on sustaining its public policy
over that of another state has, more or less, been forced to disguise its refusal to
recognize the exclusive legislative power of the latter state over the insurance trans-
action at issue. The means of disguise have been the use of the public-policy
concept3 0 or a construction of a foreign statute which "checkmat[es] its application
in the case at bar."''1 Furthermore, the uncertainty about the attitude of the forum
may confound predictability.
There can be no doubt that in comparison with other theories in vogue, the newest
pragmatic approach of the Supreme Court to the problem should be welcomed.
However, it is submitted that it has not formulated a new rationale. The language
of the Court is still couched in terms of contract. It is, of course, true that the in-
surance relationship is founded on a consensual act; but, in substance, its essential
features are, directly or indirectly, created by the state. It is an institution rather
than a contract in the usual meaning; at best, it is a contract sui generis. The
regulatory power of the forum is related to the latter's interest in the institution, an
interest which may, depending on the kind of insured interest, be determined much
12-1 310 U. S. 53 (1940) (concerning constitutionality of Virginia statute forbidding insurance contracts
on persons or property there, except through local agents who should be paid at least one half of com-
mission).
1:!s 311 U. S. 6o6 (594) (concerning Montana statute of similar import to that in Osborn v. Ozlin,
supra note 127, but requiring payment of full commission to local agent).
120 Cf. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (595o); and Note, Reaching the Out-of-State
Mail Order Insurer, 64 HAv. L. REv. 482 (i95).
130 For sharp criticism of this concept from the international aspect of the conflict of laws, see
Briggs, The Need for the "Legisatite Jurisdictional Principle" in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws,
39 MiNN. L. REv. 517, 524 (1955).
"' NussBAmt, op. ct. supra note 39, at 38. An excellent illustration of recent date is supplied
in Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., i9 Conn. 59, io9 A. 2d 896 (Sup. Ct. i954), mis-
construing N. Y. INs. LAw §x67(3) (1949).
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more by situs of the property, domicile of the insured, and locus of accident within
the forum than by the place of issuance and delivery. If the Court entertained such
a rationale, it does not clearly appear.
Third: In the matter of insurance, the Supreme Court has found a uniform
conflict rule, aside from workmen's compensation situations and ocean-marine in-
surance transactions, only for claims arising from membership in fraternal benefit
associations. In this last area, the Court, led by Mr. Justice Holmes, has continuously
pointed to the differences between the membership in an association and an ordinary
contractual relationship. The rights and duties of members, the Court has held, are
homogeneous and closely connected and must, therefore, be under the uniform rule
of the state of the domicile of the association instead of under the diversified control
of each and every state wherein a member or his beneficiary resides.132
Turning to other areas of insurance law, it appears that once a unifying principle
has been discovered and consistently followed, it may achieve, from the standpoint
of reliability, almost the same effect as uniformity. Thus, the establishment of the
insured's domicile as the forum, where the insurers, in general, are susceptible to
service, enhances predictability of results whenever there is a clash between the norms
of the lex fori and those of another jurisdiction. In the words of an American
philosopher, "conclusions from a given theory will be true even when the theory
is not absolutely true" because "an approximation of the truth may give us true
conclusions within certain limits or in a certain proportion of 6ases. '1' 33
"'Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915); Modern Woodmen of
America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544 (1925); Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305
U. S. 66 (1938); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U. S. 586 (1947); Young v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 142 Neb. 566, 7 N. W. 2d 8 (1942).
Naturally, where counsel do not raise the problem the forum might apply the lex Jori. Cf. King v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 65 F. Supp. 740 (NV. D. So. Car. 1946); such a control by the
lex fori might also result where counsel have agreed that the relationship is controlled by the lex Jori.
Cf. Rountree v. Grand Lodge of Ladies Auxiliary, 236 Mo. App. 378, 156 S. W. 2d 784 (x94).
... ComtEN, op. cdt. supra note 49, at 118.
